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Duncan’s Stein Writings: Derivation
and Logopoeia
Les écrits steiniens de Duncan : dérivation et logopée
Daniel Katz
1 Given how proudly and consistently Robert Duncan proclaimed himself a “derivative”
writer, it’s hardly surprising that in his various projects built around Gertrude Stein he
made no bones about explicitly imitating her, bestowing pamphlets or sequences with
titles such as “Names of People: Stein Imitations” or “Play Time Pseudo Stein,” and
prefacing “Writing Writing” by referring to its contents as “these pieces of writing-
like-Stein” (Duncan 2012, 445). So much a part and parcel of his broader “derivative”
project, some of these texts even found themselves published in a volume quite simply
called Derivations, a title which in itself shows that for Duncan, his relationship to Stein
was less unique than paradigmatic of his massively intertextual writing practice as a
whole. This aspect of Duncan is central to the criticism on him and I do not want to
rehearse it here, but I do want to begin by looking at the specific importance, within
the history of modernism and what comes after, of deriving explicitly from Gertrude
Stein.1 For, if one believes Wyndham Lewis, Duncan was not the first writer of note to
imitate Gertrude. In his long piece “The Dumb Ox” – the lead essay in his 1934 volume
Men Without Art – Lewis excoriates Ernest Hemingway for exactly what he sees as this
failing.  Despite  Lewis’s  self-professed  “weakness”  for  Hemingway,  and  considerable
admiration  for  his  achievement,  Lewis  refuses  to  deny  a  troubling  conclusion:
Hemingway is not original, but is rather in thrall to a master, whom he imitates. This is
bad  in  and  of  itself  according  to  Lewis,  but  it  gets  worse,  for  as  Lewis  pointedly
remarks, “his master has been a mistress,” and of a particular kind at that. Indeed, she is
a  mistress  who  so  overmasters  Hemingway  that  his  very  agency  itself  is  entirely
removed: “He [Hemingway] passes over into the category of those to whom things are
done, from that of those who execute. […] One might even go so far as to say that this
brilliant  Jewish  lady  had  made  a  clown of  him  by  teaching  Ernest  Hemingway  her
babytalk! So it is a pity” (Lewis 26-7, original italics). Lewis leaves no doubt as to his
reading: by imitating Stein, by accepting her as his “mistress,” Hemingway moves from
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active to passive, from male to female or from phallic to castrated, and from doer unto
others to the one who is always getting done. Last but not least, the neo-Nietzschean
undertone  to  Lewis’s  harping  on  Stein’s  Jewishness  very  much  suggests  that
Hemingway also shifts  from master to slave.  This  is  not  altogether a  bad thing for
Lewis, as he argues that Hemingway’s worth lies in nothing other than his ability to
express  the  mentality  of  modern society’s  slaves,  that  is,  the  herd –  a  task  in  fact
furthered by his subjugation to Stein, which brings him all the closer to the herd-soul
his writing captures.2
2 In terms of Duncan’s project, Lewis’s account of Hemingway and Stein is an especially
useful reference point because it displays paradigmatic aspects of modernist ideology
in  a  helpfully  crystallised  form,  and  thereby  reminds  us  of  the  real  radicality  of
Duncan’s positions on these issues – positions so close to orthodoxy in the 21st century
that their historical force can be too easily forgotten.3 This is of course true of all of
Duncan’s  various  divestments  of  authority,  originality,  or  what  he  calls  “self-
possession,” but let us note how Duncan’s broader conceptions (a term I will choose
here over the Olsonian “stance”) are all the more pointed in this particular context.
That is, where Lewis frets that what is most stylistically distinctive about Hemingway is
nothing other than a paradoxical resemblance to Stein, Duncan simply writes “I am not
afraid  of  sounding  like  Stein”  (Duncan  2012,  459).  And  where  Lewis  worries  that
Hemingway has been dominated and castrated by a “mistress,” Duncan writes of his
relationship to Stein, “It is this kind of submission in love and delight that I make to my
mistress. […] It is by my heart’s allegiance that I continue that I may be some day her
true disciple” (Duncan 2011, 792). Indeed, he goes so far as to dedicate Writing Writing,
in  a  syntax  clearly  derivative  of  but  different  from  Stein’s  own, “For  the  love  of
Gertrude Stein in which I labord to write in whose mode” (Duncan 2012, 445). In other
words,  if  Lewis  stresses  throughout  that  his  interest  is above  all  in  the  political
implications of Hemingway’s writing, let us not forget the political import of Duncan’s
imitations of Stein – an import at once feminist, queer, and liberatory in its recusal of
the concepts of mastery and domination altogether. And it is entirely possible that such
politics were not only an implicit rebuke from Duncan to these aspects of modernism,
but in fact an explicit response to Lewis as well. In a previously unpublished preface for
Writing Writing now included in the Collected Early Poems,  Duncan writes:  “At times I
have barely echoed her [Stein’s] manner, fondly mimicked her way. A copy book. For
another ape of God” (Duncan 2012, 792).4 The Apes of God, of course, is Wyndham Lewis’s
novel of 1930, of which a central burden is nothing other than the propensity of those
Lewis sees as ressentiment-bound inferiors to express their ambivalence towards their
betters through the medium of a slavish yet aggressive imitation – the “aping” of the
title. There is every reason to believe that Duncan knew exactly what he was doing, and
what abjected subject position he was embracing (one which Lewis incessantly harps on
as insufficiently masculine) in his imitative submission to his mistress Stein.
 
Originality, Gender, Rhetoric, and Myth
3 In  this  way  Duncan’s  various  Stein  imitations,  by  virtue  of  their  explicit  status  as
imitations,  sit  fully  within  his  broader  revaluation  and  revalorisation  of  modernist
writing by women – indeed, his revaluation of a dominant modernist ideology on the
relationship between gender, sex, sexuality, and writing – that is at the heart of the H.D.
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Book, for example, in which Stein hardly figures. As the reference to Lewis shows, these
explicit  imitations  of  a  woman  writer  –  again  by  virtue  of  their  avowed  status  as
imitations – place Duncan in pointed opposition to an entire complex of highly invested
modernist  ideologies.  For  this  reason,  although  the  various  “imitations”  are  of
considerable interest formally in the context of Duncan’s work, it would be wrong to
read them solely as formal experiments or exercises, in which Duncan tries out some of
Stein’s techniques. While this is of course extremely important, the project only takes
on its full significance if one considers its conceptual or even ideological parameters –
by which I mean Duncan’s decision to categorise these works not as technical exercises
but rather to give them the same dignity as non-imitative writings or, in other words,
the proclamation that the act of explicitly and deliberately subordinating oneself to the
writing  of  another  is  a  legitimate  writing  project.  One  might  say  that  part  of  the
meaning of the Stein imitations is that Duncan signs them, just as he did the essay “The
Homosexual  in  Society.”5 And in  these  respects,  the  Stein  writings  also  need to  be
considered  in  the  context  of  Pound’s  troubling  of  the  concepts  of  originality  and
authenticity  by  way  of  his  mobilisation  of  translation  or,  even  more,  in  terms  of
Spicer’s allegory of dictation in After Lorca. But beyond this, let us not forget that these
positions  also  in  many  ways  echo  Stein’s  own.  Stein  could  almost  be  defending
Hemingway against Lewis when she writes, “Picasso once remarked I do not care who it
is that has or does influence me as long as it is not myself” (Stein 355). In this light, one
of the most influential aspects of Stein’s writing for Duncan might well be her own
openness to influence as such. This perspective might shed new light on Brian Reed’s
suggestion that Duncan reads Stein not along the lines of Charles Bernstein, that is, as a
“decomposer of language,” but rather as a writer “embedding myths and archetypes
within  arcane  prose”  to  be  read  as  “esoteric  scripture”  (Reed  176).  For  if  Reed  is
certainly right on one level, his assertion begs another question, which would concern
the problem of  myths and archetypes  themselves  in  Duncan.  For  example,  in  “The
Truth and Life of Myth,” Duncan opposes the “myth” to what he calls the folktale or
fairytale. If myth is concerned with the “movers of the universe and initiators of first
mysteries” the folktale and fairytale “have their home in the gossip of old wives and
little  children,  stories  about  the  cooking-hearth  and  the  nursery  bedside”  (Duncan
2014, 163).  Stein,  with  her  “babytalk,”  her  interest  in  the  domestic,  her  focus  on
women’s experience, is for Duncan on the side of the fairy and folktale, to which he also
assimilates  the  Christ  story  with  its  cast  of  humble  characters,  and  Freudian
psychoanalysis, which stresses the trivial, the bodily, and the contingent rather than
the grand synthetic archetypes of Jung.
4 Indeed, as Duncan, much like Spicer, often brackets traditional sources and guarantees
of  textual  meaning  –  notably  the  author’s  singular  or  “idiotic”  intention,  whether
conscious or unconscious, or the symbolic coherence of the work seen as a finished,
ontologically  complete  entity  –  arguably  the  problem  of  contingency  is  at  the
conceptual centre of any reading of Duncan’s work. And certainly, it is very frequently
the contingency of language that is at the heart of much of Duncan’s exploration in the
Stein pieces. In this respect, Reed is right that the decision these poems ask readers to
make hinges on their  position regarding what I  take to be Duncan’s  fundamentally
divided relationship to contingency more broadly. Shall we read in accordance with the
Freudian valorisation of the metonymic, the trivial, and the accidental, or by way of a
more transcendental and mythopoetic approach, which gathers the limbs of Osiris, as it
were,  into  a  coherent  whole?6 Reed  rightly  stresses  that  Duncan  explores  several
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different Steinian modes in his imitations and handles them in several different ways.
Indeed,  the  fact  that  plausible  readings  can  be  built  following  either  of  the  two
alternatives charted by Reed speaks volumes about the forms of “openness” operative
in Duncan’s work – an openness leading less to indeterminacy than to undecidability,
perhaps. But if a global overview of Duncan’s Stein writings is beyond the scope of this
paper,7 I  want  to  focus  on  aspects  of  the  project  that  engage  most  intently  with
language as not only structure but as structure based largely on arbitrary contingencies
– work that does seem somewhat out of  keeping with the notion of  Duncan as the
author of “arcane scripture” that Reed powerfully presents. For example, here is the
short piece “Making Up,” which I quote in full:
making up to the policeman’s star;
making up in a crowded bizarre;
making up for a lack of hair;
making up the best for a fair one;
making up what you hadn’t won;
making up an ode that’s too long;
making up at the beginning of the song;
making up as an ape with ears;
making up for the leap in years;
making up seem down to all eyes;
making up a surprise to surprise. (Duncan 2012, 447)
5 Obviously, the poem is first of all a simple play on several different meanings of the
phrasal verb “to make up”: 1) to reconcile after a quarrel, as in, perhaps “making up in
a crowded bizarre” (with a presumably intentional pun on the last word); 2) to invent a
story, as in, perhaps, “making up an ode that’s too long”; 3) to compensate for, as in,
perhaps,  “making  up  for  a  lack  of  hair”;  4)  to  constitute  or  form,  as  in,  perhaps,
“making up a surprise to surprise”;  5)  to try to win the favour of another through
ostentatious niceness and deference, as in, perhaps, “making up to a policeman’s star”;
6) to put on make-up, as in, perhaps, “making up as an ape with ears.” Thus, Duncan
here points to a polysemy that is in some way random: the differences in meaning that
can be expressed by the same phrasal verb cannot be explained by different conceptual
understandings  of  what  “making”  is.  And  moreover,  none  of  these  meanings  are
carried by the verb “to make” alone, but only by the unit “to make up,” in which the
addition of “up” cannot be read either literally or figuratively in any of the examples
(in other words, the structure of “make up,” in all of the above, is in no way similar to
“to push on” or “push off,” or “come out,” for example). However, by simply listing
these  different  phrases  one after  the other,  two things  happen:  first,  their  distinct
meanings tend to get confused, so that in many of the phrases we begin to wonder
which meaning of the phrasal verb is invoked. Second, as we begin to attempt to sort
out which meaning of the verb to choose, the strangeness of the very construction is
foregrounded, as “up” itself is drawn into conversation with the other prepositions –
“for,” “to,” “in,” “at,” – which we need in order to understand which use of the phrasal
verb  is  being  invoked.  Duncan  in  fact  harps  on  the  strangeness  of  the  phrasal
construction itself by rupturing it, in the penultimate line, so that “up” is no longer
part of the verb at all, but rather its object: “making up seem down.” In other words,
this poem is not only about “making up,” in all its meanings, but also about making
“up.” Therefore, on one level this is very much a poem about prepositions, and how
they attach to verbs to constitute, or make up, “phrasal verbs,” but also how they do
not. In terms of thinking about the unmotivated productivity of compound structures,
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Duncan does something analogous in a line from “Rings,” another Stein imitation: “Out:
land, house, cry; side, man. Outriders” (Duncan 2012, 486).
6 However, in some ways still  closer to “Making Up” is another poem from the same
section in Writing Writing, titled “Turning Into.” This text consists of twenty lines, each
beginning with the words “turning into,”  which play on the phrase’s  two different
meanings: that of physically changing direction to enter a space, and that of becoming
something different. Thus, “turning into a long avenue; / turning into a lady reclining”
(Duncan  2012,  446).  This  piece  makes  manifest  a  rhetorical  figure  which  underlies
“Making up” also: syllepsis, or the yoking together of differing constructions so that
the reader is required to recode the syntax as she reads. Syllepsis might be likened to a
pun,  but  with the difference that  it  depends not  on the similarity of  sound of  two
different words,  but  rather –  as  seen in “Making Up” and “Turning Into” –  on the
radical difference of meaning of two identical constructions. While syllepsis is often
associated with Pope, Ben Lerner’s poetry shows that it is alive and well in the 21st
century, as seen in a turn of phrase like “You asked if I would enter the data like a
room” (Lerner 2004, 1) or “For I could not throw my voice / away” (Lerner 2010, 6). In
other words,  what Duncan is  working with here,  as  in many of  the Stein pieces,  is
frankly a kind of wit – an element which is far more notable in Duncan’s work generally
than the more popular conception might credit. And here, I would argue, we return to
the question of women’s writing in modernism. For Duncan can be seen here to be
foregrounding a certain kind of Steinian “logopoeia” – the element of poetry famously
defined by Pound as “the dance of the intellect among words” (Pound 1968, 25) and
seen therefore as the irreducibly non-transferable element of poetry, tied as it is to the
specificities  of  language  and  of  specific  languages,  unlike  the  imagistic  and  aural
aspects of poetry, with links to the visual arts and music respectively. If this term was
to become a staple for Pound, deployed prominently in both ABC of Reading and “How to
Read,” he first used it, in 1918, to describe the work of two women poets: Mina Loy and
Marianne  Moore.  “These  two  contributors  […]  write  logopoeia”  Pound  declares,
continuing “It is a mind cry, more than a heart cry” (Pound 1973, 424). Important work
by Peter Nicholls and Rachel Blau DuPlessis has carefully examined Pound’s original
association of logopoeia with specifically women’s writing. In that light, I would like to
add that Duncan’s Stein imitations also help us to reconfigure Stein’s place in relation
to both the mappings of poetry carried out within the modernist moment and our own
mappings of what came to be called modernism. For if on the basis of Pound’s division
of phanopoeia,  melopoeia,  and logopoeia,  we choose to consider Stein,  no less than
Moore,  Loy,  or  T.  S.  Eliot,  as  an  arch-practitioner  of  the  latter,  these  maps  shift
considerably.  That is,  if  Stein becomes an exemplar of  a  manner of  writing cast  as
encapsulating the highest degree of modernist self-aware critical intelligence rather
than,  as  Lewis  styles  her,  a  purveyor  of  incessant,  atavistic,  primitivistic,  childish
prattle,  the  effect  is more  than  that  of  recuperating  Stein  for  the  project of  high
seriousness. For beyond and more important than that, precisely, is the revaluation of
the  childish,  the  insistent,  the  unbound,  and  the  unmastered  themselves  that  was
Duncan’s aim in The H.D. Book – not to champion these as unmediated truths to mobilise
against false sophistication, but rather to unbind and release the forms of intellect, and
of dance, within them. Though Stein herself might not have wished to endorse such a
reading,  it  is  arguable  that  her  practice  was  deeply  embedded  itself  in  a  massive
revaluation of such concepts. As Bob Perelman has noted about Stein, “it needs to be
remembered how opposed to, or indifferent to, general ideas of exactitude, efficiency,
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and ‘good writing’ her own writing is” and he goes on to stress its “features that could
be labelled errors or weaknesses, or else praised as challenges to conventional notions
of good and bad” (Perelman 131). These same observations, of course, could be applied
to Duncan, not only because of his frequent defences of sentimentality, excess, error, or
everything  implied  by  the  very  idea  of  “permission,”  but  also  because  his  closest
collaborators saw him as engaged in an identical project. “The trick naturally is what
Duncan learned years ago and tried to teach us,” Spicer writes in a letter to Blaser in
Admonitions,  acknowledging  Duncan’s  priority  in  thinking  through  the  procedural
poetics which eschew the goal  of  the “perfect  poem” and lead to seriality.  “This is
where we were wrong and he was right,” Spicer continues, “but he complicated things
by saying that  there is  no such thing as  good or  bad poetry” (Spicer  163).  It’s  not
certain that Duncan ever said exactly that, and Stein most certainly did not, but they
both, willingly or not, bequeathed a complication of that distinction as part of their
legacy. What Stein and Duncan share is a mode of resistance to poetry that is quite
unlike the violence of, say, Eliot or Pound, who, while willingly engaging in practices
that  might  have  been  deemed  “anti-poetic,”  did  so  with  the  goal  of  forging  new
transcendences.  Spicer’s recognition of this aspect of Duncan, coming 5 years or so
after the heart of Duncan’s Stein work from the early fifties, makes Duncan’s inclusion
of Spicer in those very works all the more interesting.
 
Terrible Jack Spicer
7 The earliest collection of Stein writings in The Collected Early Poems is Names of People:
Stein Imitations of 1952. As the title implies, many (but by no means all) of the poems
contain proper names, frequently chosen from among Duncan’s circle in the Bay Area,
such as “Lilly Fenichel” (Duncan 2012, 420), “Kenneth and Marthe Rexroth” (ibid. 431),
or Duncan’s own life companion, “Jess Collins” (ibid. 423). Often the names are simply
dropped in the poem like objects in and of themselves – that is, the title “Names of
People” (also the title of the first poem in the book) needs to be read literally. These
poems do not refer to people by their names as much as structure themselves through
the category of the proper name, as opposed to the common noun. Thus “Names of
People” begins:
Names of people. Lilly Fenichel.
Lilly Fenichel. Names of people.
George Racket. Parker Parker.
Ambrose Bierce. Adrian Wilson. (ibid. 420).
8 This  poem  also  contains  the  line  “Who  will  forget  kindly  Jack  Spicer?”  which  is
followed by three homologous ones: “Who will forget Old Black Joe? / Who will forget
the David Barys? / Who will forget Brock Brockway to show?” (ibid. 420). If this is the
book’s dominant mode, nonetheless some poems – or sections of longer ones – do break
with  this,  notably  a  work  with  the  title  “Upon  his  Return.”  This  poem,  entirely
concerned with Spicer (who had indeed returned to the Bay Area in 1952 after around
18 months in Minnesota) might be thought of as an “imitation” of Stein works like
“Susie  Asado”;  though very different  in important  ways,  we can see it  as  Duncan’s
version  of  the  famous  Steinian  “portrait.”  But  formally,  it’s  interesting  for  other
reasons too. For example, it refers to the earlier poem “Names of People” by citing one
of that poem’s lines near the end: “But then I declared: / Who will forget kindly Jack
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Spicer” (Duncan 2012, 424), as if the second poem were in fact recounting the scene
which culminated  with  the  act  of  uttering  “Who will  forget  kindly  Jack  Spicer”  as
recorded in the first. That is, taken with its predecessor, “Upon his Return” creates a
kind of mise-en-abyme, in which the first poem is no longer a poem, but an act, the
performance of which the second poem recounts. In this way, “Upon his Return” is at
least partly about not only language generally but more specifically enunciation, cast as
act and scene, as a line from an earlier poem “returns” and is recalled not as a fragment
of language but as an act of saying. The effect of this, generally, is to cast Names of People
in a slightly different light from many of Duncan’s Stein writings, or the writings of
Stein herself. Against the abstraction and monumentality of much of Stein, for which
the  critical  analogue  has  long  been  the  cubist  painting  (although  there  is  also  a
sculptural quality to the way words in Stein can feel like blocks of matter), Names of
People consistently evokes language also as scene and act – as dynamic.8 And this sense
of dynamics carries over to Duncan’s “portrait” of Spicer also, in that therein the latter
is depicted largely as the vessel of the interplay of raging contradictory forces. In this
vein,  the  poem  begins  with  the  expression  of  an  inbuilt  contradiction:  “They  said
terrible Jack Spicer / was a nicer kind sprite / of earth” (Duncan 2012, 424). In terms of
aural structure, these lines are difficult: the full rhyme Spicer-nicer and the repeated
rhythmic figure which accompanies the delivery of the rhyme words encourage us to
over-emphasize  the  rhythm,  as  we  might  in  a  nursery  rhyme.  Yet  immediately
following, the phrase “nicer kind sprite of earth” – odd syntactically in the way “nicer”
modifies “kind” – completely disturbs the rhythmic pattern that seemed to be taking
shape.  This  parallels,  of  course,  the  disjunction between “terrible”  and “nicer  kind
sprite,” which could also be taken as a disjunction between what “they said” and what
“terrible”  Jack  Spicer  might  really  be.  While in  terms  of  structure,  the  following
nineteen lines which discuss Jack Spicer can all reasonably be read as belonging to the
group of things governed by the phrase “they said,” the poem does not harp on this,
and it’s just as reasonable to read them as in fact belonging to the poem’s implicit first-
person voice. Except, shortly before the poem’s rather gnomic end, we very abruptly
find this interjection:
They said. But then I declared:
Who will forget kindly Jack Spicer. (Duncan 2012, 424)
9 These lines, of course, disrupt the idea that the opposition between the “terrible” Jack
Spicer and the “kind nicer sprite” is due to viewpoint, as it’s the “I” and not the “they”
that adopts the predicate “kind” here. But the poem’s phoney contradiction between
differing points of view parallels the contradictions that characterise Spicer himself in
this work. “Calvinist goliard,” the poem calls him, casting Spicer’s iconoclastic rejection
of bourgeois inhibitions in favour of an apparent hedonism, as well as his disdain for
conventional pieties, as in fact a form of violent self-discipline or even self-denial. In
this vein, and even more resonantly, the poem goes on to categorise Spicer’s writing as
“a poetry / refusing itself like a comet / with a tail of tin cans” (Duncan 2012, 424).
10 This representation of Spicer’s project of lyric (self)-sabotage is acutely insightful as
well as prescient. It is arguable that in 1952 Duncan understood Spicer’s writing more
than Spicer did himself.  But I  would like to suggest  that  in the Stein project  more
broadly, Duncan also, at least in part, displays a kinship with Spicer, and a lasting one.
As Duncan’s vocabulary of “orders,” “law” and “submission,” indicates, his celebrated
“permission” never existed outside a dialectic which also included limits and refusals.
And the Stein writings are one of the places where, like Spicer, Duncan examines the
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conditions in which a poetry can refuse itself, as part of the poetic. For Duncan, as well
as  for  Pound  in  his  understanding  of logopoeia,  there  is  undoubtedly  a  dialectical
recuperation,  where the ironic and mediated logopoetical  negation and deflation of
lyrical  transcendence  becomes  the  poetic  itself.  And  as  Rachel  Blau  DuPlessis  has
brilliantly argued, Pound’s recuperation of  logopoeia,  for example in “Hugh Selwyn
Mauberley,”  also  entails  a  rejection  of  the  “feminist  critique”  with  which  the
logopoetical writing of Moore and Loy was inextricably bound (DuPlessis 38-39). What I
would like to suggest here is that Duncan’s logopoetical reading of Stein queers – or
more fully queers – this logopoetical feminist critique, also pushing it  closer to the
more radical  Dada assaults on the aesthetic,  themselves more consonant with Stein
than  with  Loy  or  Moore.  Duncan’s  writing  through  Stein,  then,  while  extending  a
problematic which reaches back to the heyday of Anglo-American modernist poetics,
also signals the transition to a more largely post-war problem of how poetry can, and
why it might feel it must, refuse itself; a problematic which, if central to Spicer, also
appears in other forms in poets as diverse as Creeley, Ashbery, Bob Kaufman, Susan
Howe, or Ben Lerner, to say nothing of conceptual writing, or the Language movement.
Indeed,  posed  in  these  terms,  the  question  risks  becoming  too  large.  Restraining
ourselves to the dialogue between Duncan and Spicer,  it  is  perhaps more useful  to
suggest  that  the  question  Duncan  works  through  here  and  elsewhere  is  whether
permission is broad enough to permit its own interdiction. That question is also the
plaintive,  arguably  Calvinist  gauntlet  that  Spicer  never  ceased  to  lay  down  before
Duncan, petulantly, provocatively, but with serious intent, as they both worked toward
a poetry  that  as  Spicer  put  it  would  be  “led  across  time not  preserved against  it”
(Spicer 122).  This would be a poetry made to resist  the mummified preservation in
amber that worries Pound in “Mauberley,” or the ideal transcendence of accident that
Eliot sought for in his “objective correlative,” or its new-critical translation into the
figure of the “well wrought urn.” In a parable of the dangers of discipleship, this is a
temporality – that of what Spicer would soon call the “time-mechanic” as opposed to
the embalmer (Spicer 122) – that Duncan presents Spicer’s epigones as having missed:
That Calvinist goliard
watcht all his boys grow up
to fit his words.
Like Basketball Heroes advertising
Donald Duck orange juice
its bright goodness frozen alive
for morning repasts of grumpiness. (Duncan 2012, 424)
11 This shows that learning derivativeness too is an art, and Duncan’s challenge is for us
to think derivativeness as an accomplishment rather than as a form of servility, while
at  the  same  time  abandoning  the  dichotomies  of  mastery/servitude  and  activity/
passivity on which such judgements are based. In these ways too, Duncan’s thought
dialogues with Spicer’s insistence that dictation requires something very different from
passivity on the part of the poet. 
12 Meanwhile, if we more readily associate a poetics of wit with Spicer than with Duncan
(think only of the importance of Donne and Dickinson for the former, for example)
further investigations of Duncan might consider not only the edge of his humor, but a
Freudian “Witz” in addition to wit, in the prose as well as the poetry. In The H.D. Book,
Duncan brings Olson’s  famous comments  on the syllable  in  “Projective  Verse”  into
dialogue  with  lines  from  H.D.  evoking  “anagrams,  cryptograms,  /  little  boxes,
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conditioned // to hatch butterflies” (cited by Duncan in Duncan 2011, 274).  Duncan
goes on to write, “In the revelation of psychoanalysis there had been a trick between
the mind and the ear, and incest or insect of that brother to this sister, the syllable that
hid the pun within the word” (ibid.). Following Freud, Duncan here stresses the pun as a
means for the repressed to return, as in slips of the tongue. In this context both puns
and slips also overlap with the mechanisms of dreaming. Yet in his book on jokes Freud
introduces a crucial distinction. “A dream is a completely asocial mental product,” he
writes, “it has nothing to communicate to anyone else” (Duncan 2011, 238). A joke, on
the  other  hand,  “is  the  most  social  of  all  mental  functions  that  aim  at  a  yield  of
pleasure. […] its completion requires the participation of someone else in the mental
process  it  starts”  (Duncan  2011,  238).  The  joke,  with  its  need  of  another  for the
procurement of pleasure, is therefore irreducibly social and erotic. And in this respect,
it  is  a  crucial  vector for the kind of  sociality  that  Spicer and Duncan wanted their
writing not only to represent, but to enact. From this perspective, Duncan and Spicer
certainly  differ  from  Stein  as  much as  they  do  from  Lewis  or  Hemingway.  Freud
repeatedly discusses how jokes often create a  complicity between teller  and hearer
with respect to an absent third, who is the target of the aggressivity the joke-form
permits to be expressed. In his show of submission to her, is Duncan’s joke ultimately
“on”  Stein?  Perhaps.  At  the  same  time,  the  logopoetic  writing  of  Moore,  Loy,  and
Duncan too at last point to the possibility of a complicity of pleasure that would not be
grounded on the premise of an excluded and abjected third. And Duncan’s embracing of
derivativeness can also be seen as a first rejection of that economy.
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NOTES
1. For an excellent account of Duncan as a derivative poet, see Stephen Collis’ introduction to the
edited volume, Reading Duncan Reading: Robert Duncan and the Poetics of Derivation (2012). See also
Nathaniel Mackey’s pathbreaking “Gassire’s Lute” in The Paracritical Hinge (2005) for more on this.
2. For a more detailed account of Lewis’s reading of Hemingway’s relationship to Stein, see my
American Modernism’s Expatriate Scene (100-107).
3. I do not wish to imply that I consider “modernist ideology” to be a single, coherent entity, far
from it. Among the major tenets associated with modernism one finds contradictions not only
within particular groupings of writers, but even within individual writers and, in fact, within
individual works! That said, certain constellations of values do consistently emerge, and in Lewis
and Pound,  for  example,  one  frequently  finds  grouped together  as  a  logical  unit  notions  of
individual genius, newness, originality, self-reliance, independence, phallic potency, and hetero-
normative sexuality.
4. Given both the context and Duncan’s penchant for odd and archaic usages, I read “barely” here
as “nakedly” and not “minimally.”
5. When  Duncan  was  given  the  opportunity  to  publish  “The  Homosexual  in  Society”
anonymously  he  pointedly  refused,  answering  “the  whole  thing  has  no  meaning  if  it  is  not
signd” (original spelling and italics). See Faas 150.
6. By this I mean that while the Jungian tradition, broadly speaking, reads symbols through a
metaphorical lens which assumes their meanings are anchored transcendentally, regardless of
context,  in his work on dreams and hysteria Freud consistently reads symptoms or manifest
dream content by way of contingent associations and connections, which it is the goal of “free
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association” to reveal (there are of course exceptions). Duncan frequently returns to this strand
of Freud’s thought, above all in The H.D. Book and “The Truth and Life of Myth.”
7. Reed’s piece provides an excellent one.
8. With regard to a sculptural quality of Stein, Reed points out that Duncan consistently plays on
“Stein” as “stone” in her own work (Reed 169). Meanwhile, it should not be forgotten that the
question of temporality I’m stressing here was also a major concern for Stein, though one she
approaches in quite different ways.
ABSTRACTS
This  article begins  by  considering  Duncan’s  Stein  writings  as  a  criticism  of  highly  invested
modernist suppositions regarding originality and mastery, these latter exemplified by Wyndham
Lewis’s view of Hemingway as castrated and belittled by his inability not to imitate Gertrude
Stein. It continues to examine Duncan’s mobilisation of syllepsis in his Stein writings, and to
relate this figure to the Poundian conception of logopoeia,  first elaborated in relation to the
writings of Mina Loy and Marianne Moore. This allows for a recontextualisation of Stein within
the  history  of  Anglo-American  modernist  poetry  by  women,  and  a  consideration  of  its
consequences. The paper ends with a brief examination of the relationship of Duncan and Spicer
in their shared but distinct projects of challenging essential tenets of modernist lyric ideology, a
project  for  which Stein proves  a  crucial  resource to  Duncan,  not  least  in  offering a  form of
“permission” for the exploration of certain forms of “bad” writing.
Cet essai prend pour point de départ la critique des conceptions modernistes d’originalité et de
maîtrise dans les « Écrits  steiniens » de Robert Duncan.  De telles  conceptions s’expriment de
façon  exemplaire  chez  Wyndham  Lewis  qui  ne  cache  pas  son  mépris  pour  un  Hemingway
supposément avili et châtré par son incapacité à ne pas émuler Gertrude Stein. Dans un second
temps, nous examinerons la mobilisation de la figure de la syllepse chez Duncan, à la lumière de
l’idée  poundienne  de  « logopée »,  concept  à  l’origine  associé  à  la  poésie  de  Mina  Loy  et  de
Marianne  Moore.  Ceci  permettra  de  reconsidérer  la  position  de  Stein  au  sein  de  la  poésie
moderniste féminine anglo-américaine et d’en examiner les conséquences. Pour conclure, nous
considérerons le rapport entre Duncan et Spicer dans leur projet commun de mettre à l’épreuve
certains aspects clés de l’idéologie poétique moderniste. Dans ce contexte, nous verrons que Stein
offre des ressources précieuses à Duncan, en particulier la « permission » qu’elle accorde à une
exploration possible du « mal écrit », base de la transvaluation de la poésie si prisée par Duncan
comme par Spicer.
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